Historias laborales incompletas y altamente fragmentadas amenazan con dejar a muchos contribuyentes de los regímenes de pensiones de América Latina sin la pensión mínima garantizada, o incluso sin acceso a la pensión (jubilación) común. En el presente estudio, se propone una metodología para evaluar este riesgo, identificar los grupos vulnerables y estudiar los posibles factores determinantes de las historias de contribuciones, utilizando la información de los registros de historia de laboral de las instituciones de seguridad social. Aplicando esta metodología sobre los registros de la principal institución de seguridad social del Uruguay, el Banco de Previsión Social, se obtiene que la mayoría de los contribuyentes de esta institución podría no cumplir con el mínimo de años de cotización requeridos actualmente para acceder a una pensión (jubilación) común al llegar a las edades habituales de retiro.
INTRODUCTION
The low coverage of the social security systems in Latin America is a motive for concern. Coverage is low in many countries both among the elderly and the working population. The proportion of the elderly who are receiving pensions is a direct indicator of the effectiveness of the systems to provide income security in old age, but the proportion of the economically active population that is contributing is also important as it conditions the access to and the amount of future pensions. Like in other developing regions, large segments of the economically active population do not contribute to the pension system in Latin America (Gill et al. 2003; Auerbach et al. 2005; Rofman and Lucchetti 2006) .
While low participation of workers in the pension system is always a problem, the exact nature, causes and policy implications of the phenomenon are likely to be different depending on whether participation in social security is a permanent or a temporary status for each worker. Low aggregate coverage might arise because the population is segmented, with some workers contributing and other workers not contributing, or because many workers contribute only part of their working career. In the first scenario, those workers who are contributing to the system are basically protected and are expected to receive a pension. In the second scenario instead, there might be a considerable number of workers who would not be well protected despite of being registered as contributors. Therefore, it is not only the average rate of contributors in the population what matters but also the turnover. A similar issue has recently been raised about labor informality in Latin America. Perry et al. (2007) describe a pretty dynamic picture, where many workers transit between formality and informality. Bosch and Maloney (2006) analyze the transitions between salaried and self-employed workers in Mexico and show that there is indeed a significant turnover.
Furthermore, the turnover of workers between contributing and not contributing is having an increasing impact on the access to pensions in practice as the social security administrations are increasing their capacity to control the fulfillment of the vesting period conditions. Not long ago, the social security administrations had almost no records of the individual contributions they had collected, and could not check whether workers had accumulated the years of contributions legally required to access a pension. Benefits were hence granted on a very informal basis, often appealing to the testimony of witnesses. Albeit difficult to prove, there are many informal tales suggesting that having connections in the social security institutions and in the political system was also helpful to get a pension in some countries. It is no wonder then that many people managed to get a contributory pension even when they had not contributed the required number of years. This state of affairs is gradually changing in several countries in the region as the social security systems started to build work history records as part of the reforms that took place in the eighties and nineties. Social security administrations are increasingly being able to check individual records of contributions, leading to a better enforcement of the conditions to access to pensions. These are mostly good news, but there is also a risk that many workers do not adapt to the new conditions and end up with a very low pension or no pension at all. Aware of this risk, several governments in Latin America are currently considering options to reduce the number of periods of contribution required to access a pension. In the case of Chile, for example, the reform that the government proposed to the parliament in 2007 eliminates the condition that workers had 20 years of contribution to access the minimum pension guarantee. Colombia is also considering a reform that would reduce the vesting period (the so called Beneficio Economico Periodico or periodic economic benefit). Options to soften this requirement are also in the agenda of the social security authorities of Uruguay.
Some social security institutions have recently delivered samples of the work history records and some other institutions will probably follow their way in the near future. These rich and large panel datasets can in principle be used to assess the proportion of workers who could reach the required periods of contributions at the retirement age, but the available histories are still partial, usually about 10 to 15 years long. In this paper, we present a methodology to assess the access to pensions building life-time work histories from incomplete histories and present results for the case of Uruguay. The paper aims to answer several questions. How many workers will not comply with the years of contributions required to access a pension at ordinary retirement ages? Which are the most vulnerable groups? What factors condition the probability that a worker accumulates the required years of contribution at the usual retirement ages?
We applied our methodology to a database of the work history records of the largest social security institution of Uruguay, the Banco de Prevision Social (BPS). We found that, unless there is a significant change in the patterns of contribution in the future, compared to the period in which the sample was taken (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) , a vast majority of the contributors to this institution will not comply with the years of contribution that are required to access a pension. Our results show that the situation will be particularly severe among low income workers working in the private sector. These gloom projections seem to be at odds with the comparatively high coverage that the old-age pension programs have achieved among the elderly in Uruguay. But it should be noticed that the current levels of coverage were achieved in a period in which the BPS was not really able to enforce the periods-of-contribution condition to access to pensions. This was so because of the lack of work history records. This situation is gradually changing as the institution accumulates records of contribution.
The literature that analyzes access to pensions in Latin America has used a variety of concepts, data sources and methodologies. The most widely used data source is the household survey. Analysts have long been using this data to compute coverage of the labor force as the proportion of the economically active population that contributes to the social security system. Rofman and Lucchetti (2006) provide extensive computations of this and related indicators across several Latin American countries and explore the links between the rate of coverage and several key socio-economic characteristics (like education, sector of activity, size of the firm, etc.). Using the same data source, several researchers have used qualitative dependent variable models to estimate the probability that workers contribute to social security and to analyze what factors impact on this probability (Auerbach et al. 2005; Barr and Packard 2003; Barrientos 1996 and 1998; Bustamante and Paola 2006; Holzmann et al. 2000; Li and Olivera 2005; Packard et al. 2006; Packard 2001 ; among others). The household surveys are rich data sources but they only provide cross section information at individual level, so these surveys are not suited to the type of questions we aim to answer. Besides, some household surveys provide information about affiliation to social security but not about actual contributions. It has been reported in several countries in Latin America that the number of affiliates is significantly larger than the number of effective contributors at any point in time.
Taking advantage of the recently available work history data bases, several analysts have been looking at the individual density of contributions, i.e. the proportion of lifetime that each worker contributes to social security (Bertranou and Sanchez 2003; Arenas de Mesa et al. 2004; Lagomarsino and Lanzilotta 2004; Bucheli et al. 2005 and Bravo et al. 2006; Berstein et al. 2005 and . Building on this literature, we use in this paper survival analysis to model the transitions between contributing and not contributing. Survival analysis allows us to adopt more flexible assumptions than those adopted in the literature mentioned above to address this issue. We then use the transition rates to simulate the complete work histories of hypothetical workers using Monte Carlo simulations.
In the next section, we present a brief summary of the Uruguayan pension system. We describe the data in section 3. In section 4 we present the methodologies for the estimation of the hazard rates and the simulation of the work histories. The main results are reported in section 5 and section 6 concludes.
THE SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM IN URUGUAY
Before the social security reform initiated in 1996, the Uruguayan retirement system relied on a pay-as-you-go (PAYG) system financed through payroll contributions paid by employers and employees. Contribution was also mandatory for self-employed workers who were subject to minimum declared earnings. A public institution, the Banco de Previsión Social (BPS), administered four large programs that covered public servants, private workers (with some exceptions), rural workers and domestic workers. In addition, some categories of workers had their own special pension schemes: bank employees, notaries, self-employed university graduates, armed forces personnel, and police force personnel. By 2001, the number of contributors to the BPS represented 89% of the total number of contributors to all social security institutions in the country (Ferreira-Coimbra and Forteza 2004) .
In 1996, a reform modified the BPS programs introducing individual savings accounts to complement the PAYG system. Workers with wages below a threshold continue to be served by the PAYG regime administered by BPS unless they explicitly choose to deposit half of their contributions in a personal account. Workers with higher wages must contribute to both pillars. For the amount below the minimum they contribute to the PAYG public system and from there up to a certain maximum, also established by law, they must contribute to individual accounts. There is no mandatory contribution for earnings over the established maximum. Employers' contributions go exclusively to the public PAYG pillar.
The reform introduced other modifications, mainly with the aim of strengthening the link between contributions and pensions, and postponing the retirement age. The minimum retirement age was fixed at 60 for men and women, which meant an increase of 5 years for the latter. Also, the minimum number of years of contribution required to access an ordinary pension was raised from 30 to 35. Workers can receive a contributory pension with only 15 years of contribution, but this benefit is smaller than the ordinary pension and eligibility is restricted to individuals who are 70 years or older. Workers with hazardous occupations and other special categories have special bonus on their count of years of contribution.
The replacement rate was modified, making it more sensitive to both retirement age and years of contributions, in order to induce longer working-lives. Before the reform, the replacement rates ranged from 65% to 80% for women and from 60% to 80% for men. The reform eliminated gender differences and the replacement rate now ranges from 50% to 82.5%, depending on the years of contribution and the retirement age. The average wage used in the benefit formula was modified to include a longer period of contributions. In addition, there is an extra bonus for low-income workers who choose to contribute to individual savings accounts.
Persons who do not satisfy the requirements to access a contributory pension may be eligible for a means-tested pension program. With the reform, the minimum age required for this benefit was raised from 65 to 70.
The reform also established the systematic registration of workers' labor history. Before that, insomuch as these administrative records did not exist, the control of the actual years of contributions was very difficult and done on very informal bases, such as the testimony of witnesses.
THE DATA
We used a random sample of the work history records of the BPS, The records are organized in five databases. One file gives personal information on individuals: date of birth, sex and country of birth. Another file reports about the job of each person, particularly the date of initiation of activity and the explicit end of the link between the worker and the firm. A third file reports monthly information about the contributions. In particular, we have information on wages and some characteristics of the job. Also, there is a database reporting information about benefits that allowed us to know the date of retirement. Finally, there is a database that provides information on firms' characteristics (size, industry, etc.), but we do not use it in this paper. Table 1 shows the number of individuals in the database by cohort, gender and private/public condition. The gender composition is quite similar to the one found by Bucheli (2004) based on the Household Surveys. Specifically, there are 37,822 men (55%) and 31,175 women (45%). We considered as public worker everyone who had worked in the public sector for at least half of the total time he or she had contributed. According to this criterion, we identified 58,617 (85%) private and 10,380 (15%) public workers in the database. While public sector contributors are evenly distributed between sexes (51% are women), private sector contributors are predominantly men (44% are women).
The database contains two variables that report the beginning and end of the job spells. The spells may include some non-working periods -like low season in the case of seasonal workers or workers on sickness or maternity leave-, which are computed for contribution purposes.
A descriptive statistic that has been widely used to describe the contribution patterns is the socalled "density of contributions". This variable measures the proportion of months that a worker contributed over the potential months he could have contributed. The average density of contributions is 60% in our sample. Lagomarsino and Lanzilotta (2004) report a density of contributions significantly higher, of around 75%, between January 1997 and December 2003. They used a sample of the workers registered in the labor history records of the BPS which was collected in the second semester of 1996. This collection choice has problems given that it loses all the workers who entered the database afterwards. In addition, workers with intermittent activities in the BPS and lower densities of contribution are less likely to be included in their sample than workers with higher densities of contributions. As a result, their calculations on the density of contributions are biased-upwards.
The distribution of the density of contributions has two modes and is strongly asymmetric, characteristics also pointed out by Lagomarsino and Lanzilotta (2004) . A similar pattern has been reported in Argentina (Farall et al. 2003; and Bertranou and Sánchez 2003) . In our sample, 28% of the workers contributed 100% of the period. This was the most frequent density of contributions in the database. Besides, over 40% do not register contributions for at least half of the potential months of contribution (Table 2 ).
Men present higher densities of contribution than women. Indeed, on average men contributed 61.4% and women contributed 58.0% of the time.
As expected, public sector workers have significantly higher densities of contribution than private sector workers. On average, public sector workers contributed 85.4% and private sector workers contributed 55.3% of the time. While more than two thirds of public employees contributed the whole period, only 21% of private employees contributed that much. Moreover, a significantly smaller proportion of public than of private workers contributed less than half of the time. There is however a considerable number of individuals classified as public employees who present low densities of contribution. This unexpected result responds in part to the classification as public employees of workers who contributed only part of the time as public employees. Also, this estimation does not correct for those activities with special bonuses, i.e. activities that compute more than one year of contribution per every year of actual contribution. This is the case of most teachers.
Additionally, we grouped the individuals in the sample in quintiles of the earnings distribution. In order to avoid the circular reasoning of finding low densities for workers whose low average income is due to few periods of contribution, we calculated the average earnings over periods in which individuals reported strictly positive earnings. Then, we grouped five-year generations workers by sex and we calculated the quintiles of the earnings distribution for each group. The average density of contribution consistently rises with the quintile of these distributions. Indeed, the average density of contribution is almost 38% for the poorest quintile and more than 80% for the richest quintile.
There are also significant differences according to individuals' age. At 20, the density of contribution is about 30% on average and it continuously increases with age, exceeding 75% when workers are in their fifties. However, there is an important dispersion for individuals of the same age, as it is shown in Table 3 .
The business cycle seems to have had a significant impact on the density of contribution. The Uruguayan economy began a recession in 1999 which was followed by the most severe economic crisis in the country's history. The recovery began slowly in 2003, and 2004 was already a year of significant growth. This evolution is reflected in the unemployment and employment rates observed between 1996 and 2004. In this period of significant macroeconomic volatility, the density of contribution mirrored the rate of employment (figure 1).
METHODOLOGY
We want to estimate the proportion of workers who would reach the number of periods of contribution required to access a pension at the normal retirement ages and to identify the most vulnerable groups. It is not possible to estimate this proportion directly though, partly because the conditions are changing and workers and firms also change their behavior, but also because we do not have full lifetime work histories in the region. With the incomplete work histories we have, it is not possible at the moment to directly estimate how many periods of contributions workers have accumulated when they reach the retirement age. We propose in this paper a twostage methodology to estimate the distribution function of the counting of periods of contributions along lifetime. In the first stage, we estimate the rates of transition (or hazard rates) between contributing and not contributing in each period along the lifetime. In the second stage, we simulate the lifetime work histories using the hazard rates estimated in the first stage and compute the distribution functions of the counting of periods of contribution at different ages.
First stage: estimating the hazard rates
Consider a worker who may be in any of two possible states: contributing and not contributing to social security. Depending on circumstances and his choices, the worker will be making transitions between these two states. Let ( ) t c X t h , be the probability that a worker who does contribute to social security during month t stops contributing in t+1 and let be the probability that a worker who does not contribute to social security during month t starts contributing in t+1. These probabilities are the (discrete time) transition rates or hazard rates of the states "contributing" and "not contributing" respectively. The hazard rates may depend on several variables represented by X
In order to identify the hazard functions, different alternative assumptions are usually made in the literature. The most common one is that the hazard rate can be decomposed in two multiplicative terms, one that summarizes the impact of duration in the state, the so called baseline hazard, and a term that summarizes the impact of the covariates X t . This model has been called proportional hazard because the hazard rates of two individuals who differ only in time-invariant covariates maintain a constant ratio, which is in turn proportional to the absolute difference in the covariates.
In a discrete time framework, the proportional hazard assumption leads to the following specification (Jenkins 2005 , pp 41-2):
where t γ summarizes the baseline hazard. This model is known as the cloglog model, because a complementary log-log transformation of the hazard is a linear function of the baseline hazard and the covariates:
An alternative identifying assumption that is often used in discrete time models is that the odds ratios are proportional to the absolute difference in the covariates. This assumption leads to the logistic hazard model:
where t α summarizes the relative odds of making a transition when X = 0.
In order to identify t γ and t α in the cloglog and the logistic models, additional assumptions have to be made about the underlying functional forms. Lacking specific theoretical guidance, we adopted the usual practice of using dummies to represent duration and age. Once the empirical duration and age patterns could be identified, we chose some more parsimonious functional forms to facilitate the simulations. We decided to use a polynomial of degree three on age and the log of duration. As the pattern of duration might vary along the life cycle, we included two variables of interaction between duration and age.
The work history data set presents some characteristics that make the estimations of the hazard rates relatively complex. The data contains censoring and truncation, multiple spells and unobserved heterogeneity. We briefly explain how we dealt with each of these complications in what follows.
A spell of contributions is expected to end when the worker transits from contributing to not contributing, but the observed spell can also end because of the end of the observation period. If this happens, we only know that the worker did not transit to the other state before the last period of observation but we do not know whether the worker made or made not a transit afterwards. This right censoring is not a major problem for the estimation of the hazard rates though. It is enough to acknowledge the fact that the only information we have about the last observation is that the individual survived in the state at least until that period.
In our data set, right censoring occurs in two different cases. First, observations are censored at the end of the work history sample. We do not know the contributing state of any worker after December 2004. Second, a worker may die or retire during the period of observation. Death and retirement could be thought of as different states in the context of a competing risks model. In this context, the destination-specific censoring indicators of the states contributing and not contributing take value zero when the individuals die or retire.
There is left censoring when the starting date is not observed. In our data, the spells of not contribution that began before April 1996 are left censored. We did not use these spells in the estimations. There is no left censoring of the spells of contribution in this data set. Even when the spell may have began before the initial observation date we have the information about when these spells began.
There is truncation when some survival times are systematically excluded from the sample. Left truncation occurs when individuals who did not survive enough are excluded and right truncation occurs when individuals who survive too much are excluded. In our data set, there might be left truncation of the spells of contribution. The work history database captures all individuals who contributed at least one month between April 1996 and December 2004. Consider two workers who began to contribute say in January 1990, but one left one year later and never returned and the other one continued at least until April 1996. While the second worker will be registered in the social security database, the first worker with the shorter spell will be excluded.
Unobserved heterogeneity may significantly bias these estimations. Over time, the proportion in the population of individuals with high risk of leaving the state declines. Thus, the average hazard rates of mixed populations tend to decline over time even if the "true" hazard rates of the individuals in the population rise. In order to reduce uncontrolled heterogeneity, we worked separately with several categories of workers whose behavior is likely to differ. We distinguished men and women, public and private workers and quintiles of the labor income distribution. For each category, we run formal tests of unobserved heterogeneity and controlled for the heterogeneity that could still remain modeling it as an individual effect. Assuming that the individual effects are normally distributed with zero mean, the hazard rates for mixed distributions can be estimated using random effects complementary loglog or logit models (Jenkings 2005, pp 84-5) . We used the xtcloglog and xtlogit commands in STATA to estimate these models (Stata 2003) . The program reports the likelihood ratio test for the null hypothesis that the variance of the individual effects is zero. Frailty is not important if this hypothesis cannot be rejected. Otherwise, frailty matters and the random effects estimation takes it into account.
The strategy to model the probability of contributing used in this paper is more general than previous attempts we could identify in the literature (including our own previous work). The first studies on this subject that we could find assumed that the probability of contributing is independent of previous status, which is a strong assumption as Bucheli et al (2005) explicitly acknowledge (Bertranou and Sanchez 2003; Arenas de Mesa et al. 2004; Lagomarsino and Lanzilotta 2004; Bucheli et al. 2005; Bravo et al 2006) . The assumption of independence actually amounts to assuming the following two hypotheses (i) the hazard rates do not depend on duration, and (ii) one minus the hazard rate of the state "contributing" equals the hazard rate of the state "not contributing". These hypotheses not only look strong, but they can also be tested and so there is no need to just assume them as true.
In a recent study, we extended the framework adopted in the papers mentioned above, allowing the probabilities of contributing to depend on the previous period status ( Bucheli et al. 2006) . We dropped the assumption that one minus the hazard rate of "contributing" equals the hazard rate of "not contributing", but we still maintained the not very appealing assumption that the hazard rates do not depend on duration in the state. This hypothesis was formally tested and systematically rejected in the framework proposed in this paper.
Second stage: simulating the work histories
Our final goal is to build empirical distribution functions of the number of periods of contributions at the usual retirement ages. This can be done analytically, if the probabilities of contributing each period are independent of previous period status, as we have shown in a previous study (Bucheli et al. 2005) . But it cannot generally be done analytically when the probabilities of contributing depend on previous periods status and vary along the life cycle. In this case, work histories are determined by a non-homogenous Markov chain. We performed Monte Carlo simulations to overcome this difficulty.
The simulation of the work histories entails building strings of "c" and "n" (for contributing and not contributing, respectively) that adequately replicate the stochastic properties of the observed incomplete histories. The simulated worker contributes in t if either he was contributing in t-1 and did not make a transition to not contributing or he was not contributing in t-1 and made a transition to contributing. Let p represent the propensity to make transitions and let us assume that it is drawn from a uniform distribution in the [ ] 
and he was not contributing in t-1. With this rule, the probability that an individual who contributes in t-1 also contributes in t is , which is the probability of not leaving the state "contributing". The probability that an individual who does not contribute in t-1 contributes in t is , which is the probability of leaving the state "not contributing".
(
The above algorithm was applied to the lifetime of each simulated individual. The simulations began at age 18 in the state "not-contributing" and ended at age 70. The number of months of contribution accumulated at any age could then be counted in each simulated work history. Repeating this procedure many times, we got empirical distributions of the counting of the months of contribution at the desired ages.
RESULTS

The hazard rates
We estimated the complementary loglog and logit models, getting very similar results. For the sake of brevity, we only present here the results obtained with the complementary loglog model. 3 The results are summarized in tables 4 to 11.
The unemployment rate has a significant positive impact on the hazard rate of contributing and a significant negative impact on the hazard rate of not contributing for most categories of private workers. This is to be expected, as in periods of high unemployment workers stop contributing at higher rates because of job loss and transition to informality, and find it more difficult to get formal jobs. However, we do not find this pattern for men in the poorest quintile and women in the poorest two quintiles. Higher hazard rates of contributing and lower hazard rates of not contributing lead to lower densities of contribution during downturns. In the case of Chile, Bertsein et al. (2006) report that the unemployment rate has a negative impact on the density of contributions of men, but positive on the density of contributions of women.
Not surprisingly, the unemployment rate does not impact on the hazard rates of contributing and not-contributing for most categories of public workers. However, some middle income public workers show lower hazard rates of contributing during recessions. A possible explanation for these contrasting patterns is that while private workers lose jobs during downturns, public workers choose not to quit when it is more difficult to find a job in the private sector.
Age has an impact on the hazard rates of contributing and not-contributing as well. Young workers tend to have higher hazard rates of both contributing and not contributing than middleaged workers, implying that the turnover rates are particularly high at the beginning of the working career. Senior workers tend to show higher hazard rates of contributing and lower hazard rates of not contributing than middle-aged workers. This is to be expected, as senior workers are more likely to stop contributing and less likely to restart contributing after they stopped than workers who are in the middle of their working careers and have not yet arrived to the retirement age.
In both states, the probabilities of making a transition reduce as the workers spend time in the state. Indeed, duration has a highly significant negative impact on the hazard rates of both contributing and not-contributing. In most regressions the coefficient for duration was found to be negative and different from zero at 0.1% significance level. The hazard rates drop initially fast and tend to stabilize for long durations. The estimated coefficient varies across categories, but it is worth noting that even in the public sector duration has a highly significant impact on the hazard rates.
Young workers tend to have not only higher but also more resilient hazard rates than workers aged 30 to 59 years. Like their more mature fellows, young workers show decreasing probabilities of making a transition out of any of the two states as they spend time in the state, but the rate at which these probabilities decline is lower in the case of workers below 30 than in the case of workers aged 30 to 59. In other terms, duration has a higher negative impact on the hazard rates of contributing and not contributing when workers are between 30 and 59 years old than earlier in their lifetime. The coefficient of the variable that captures the interaction between duration and the dummy variable for age 30 to 59 is negative in all regressions and significantly different from zero at 0.1% significance level in most regressions. The pattern is less clear for senior workers (aged 60 and above): some categories present negative, some positive and some non significant coefficients multiplying the corresponding duration-age interaction variable. Table 12 provides some simulated hazard rates of contributing in a typical year, i.e. with the unemployment rate at the mean of the period. For instance, the average 40 years old man working in the private sector and belonging to the richest quintile has an expected hazard rate of about 3.8% in the first month and only 0.7% in the 36 th month of contribution. The same individual at 25 would have an expected hazard rate of 4.9% in the first month and 1.0% in the 36 th month of contribution. Table 13 provides some simulated hazard rates of not contributing in a typical year. The average 40 years old men working in the private sector and belonging to the richest quintile has an expected hazard rate of about 6.8% in the first month and only 2.0% in the 36 th month he spends in the state "not contributing". The same individual at 25 would have an expected hazard rate of 7.8% in the first month and 4.0% in the 36 th month in the state not contributing.
The simulated hazard rates also indicate that lower income workers tend to have higher risk of leaving the state "contributing" and lower risk of leaving the state "not contributing". Therefore, low income workers are less likely to contribute than high income workers because they have higher probabilities of leaving the state contributing and lower probabilities of entering this state.
Workers in the public sector present higher hazard rates of not contributing than private workers. They also present lower hazard rates of contributing. Thus, public workers have higher probabilities of contributing than private workers because they have lower probabilities of leaving the state contributing and higher probabilities of entering into this state.
Considering these results altogether, some distinctive patterns emerge. First, the hazard rate of both states decline with duration. As workers spend time in any of the two states, the chances of staying in the state rise. History and luck during the first periods in the state seem thus to be crucial for the fate of the working career. Second, young workers have higher risk of quitting the state contributing but also of quitting the state not contributing, i.e. they are more mobile. Third, economic downturns raise the risk that private workers stop contributing and reduce the chances that they start contributing.
The simulations
According to our estimations, there is a serious risk that a sizeable proportion of the workers registered in the work history records of the BPS will not be able to accumulate the 35 years of contribution required to be eligible for a pension when they reach the usual retirement ages. If the frequencies of monthly contributions observed between 1996 and 2004 remain unchanged, only about 21% of contributors will have made the required 35 years of contributions by the age of 60 and about 29% by the age of 65 (Table 14) . The 35-years-of-contributions condition will be binding for a vast majority of contributors.
As expected, the problem is more serious for women than men. While only 27% of women satisfy the requirements at 65, 34% of men manage to do so at the same age. These figures fall to 20% and 25%, respectively, at 60.
Public employees are more likely to meet the requirements than private workers. Only 20% of men and 16% of women working in the private sector satisfy the access condition when they turn 65 years old. In contrast, 74% of men and 72% of women working in the public sector satisfy the condition at the same age.
We have also found big differences between workers in different income brackets. Low-income workers are much less likely to meet the accessibility requirements than higher-income workers at any given age. In fact, private workers in the poorest quintile are practically out of the system. In contrast, 95% of the men and 86% of the women in the richest quintile working in the public sector would access a pension when they turn 65 years old.
We also estimated the probability of accumulating 30 rather than 35 years of contribution at the retirement ages (Table 15) . The difference between these two estimations provides a rough approximation to the direct impact on pension coverage of changing the minimum number of years of contribution required to access a pension. This measure does not take into account the indirect effects of such changes, though. It is possible, for example, that a reduction in the number of periods of contribution required to access a pension induce some workers to contribute less periods. It is also possible that an increase in the number of periods of contribution required to access a pension, like the one approved in 1995, provides incentives for some workers to contribute more periods. If this is the case, the total impact on coverage of changing this condition to access a pension will be lower than the direct impact estimated here. Therefore, the estimated difference between the probabilities of contributing 30 and 35 years at the retirement provide an upper bound to the total impact of this change.
Given certain probabilities of transition between contributing and not contributing, the proportion of individuals who accumulate 30 years of contributions is necessarily higher than the proportion of individuals who accumulate 35 years of contributions at any given age. If the density of contributions observed between 1996 and 2004 remain unchanged almost 35% and 41% of the population registered in the labor history records will accumulate 30 years of contributions when they turn 60 and 65 years old, respectively (Table 15) . The difference between the proportion of workers who would contribute 30 and 35 years is around 13 percentage points for both ages considered. The difference is similar for men and women. Changes of the number of years of contribution required to access a pension seem to impact more strongly on individuals with high and medium densities of contribution than on individuals with low densities. Indeed, workers with very low densities of contributions are not likely to contribute either 30 or 35 years.
According to these results, the increase in the vesting period passed in 1995 will likely cause a sizable decrease in the proportion of contributors who will fulfill this requirement. This tightening of the conditions to access a pension is therefore likely to cause a significant reduction in the proportion of individuals that can retire at any given age, and an increase in the average retirement age. Obviously, for these phenomena to take place, the social security administration has to actually check individual records of contributions and enforce the pension access conditions. This was not warranted in the past, but the ability of the administration to do it is growing gradually as information based on labor history records is being accumulated.
The simulations are sensitive to the business cycle. We showed in the previous section that the unemployment rate impact on the hazard rates and hence the simulated work histories depend on the assumptions made about the unemployment rate. The simulations presented so far are based on the average unemployment rate in the period covered by the work history database, i.e. between April 1996 and December 2004, which was 13.45%. In order to analyze the sensitivity of the results to this variable, we estimated the proportion of workers who would accumulate 30 and 35 years of contribution with the unemployment rate at the 1981-2006 average, which was 11.20% (tables 16 and 17).
As expected, we find a higher proportion of workers accumulating the required years of contribution when we run the simulations with the lower unemployment rate. For example, the proportion of men in the private sector who would have accumulated 35 years of contribution at the age of 65 grows from 20 to 30% (tables 14 and 16). In the case of women, this figure would rise from 16 to 23%. However, the poorest workers are practically unaffected by the change in the unemployment rate. Most of them are basically out of the system with any of the two unemployment rates used in the simulations. The business cycle has a more significant impact on the work history of workers in higher quintiles of the distribution.
The work histories of public employees do not seem to be very sensitive to the business cycle. The proportion of workers who accumulate 30 and 35 years of contribution at the retirement ages is very similar when the simulations are run with the two different unemployment rates.
Overall, these results suggest that even though the densities of contribution would be higher in periods with "normal" unemployment rates than in the period in which the work history sample was taken, the proportion of workers who would comply with the required years of contribution at the usual retirement ages would still be very low. Running the simulations with the average unemployment rate of the last 25 years, we still get that only 30% of men and 23% of women would have accumulated 35 years of contribution at the minimum retirement age, i.e. at 60 (table 16 ).
The simulations presented so far were based on computations of the periods of service for regular jobs. There are some occupations that compute more than one period of service per period of effective contribution though. This is the case of most teachers and individuals working in risky activities. For example, workers handling radioactive substances register 3 periods of service every 2 periods of effective contribution, and hence they are required to contribute a significantly smaller number of periods to be eligible for a pension. The special regimes are relatively frequent among some groups of public employees, but they are much less frequent among private employees. Hence we do not expect these regimes to have a significant impact on the estimations of the proportion of private employees who would qualify for a pension. Women in the richest quintile register the largest incidence of special regimes among private workers, and yet only around 3% of them have special bonuses for at least half of the time they have contributed.
In contrast, over 30% of every income group of women working in the public sector has a special bonus at least half of the total time they have contributed. This figure exceeds 46% when it comes to women in the richest quintile. Workers that present the lowest incidence of these regimes in the public sector are men in the fourth highest quintile, and almost 12% of them work in activities with bonus for at least half of the time.
We computed a proxy for the number of periods of service of public workers in activities with special bonuses. A worker who contributed one period in any of these activities will be granted more than one period of service (the exact number depending on the bonus legally attached to the activity). This correction of the original estimation increases the estimated proportion of public workers who would satisfy accessibility requirements for every subgroup of public employees. As expected, the difference between the estimations that take into account special bonus and those which do not is much bigger among women than men. The proportion of public workers who accumulate 35 years of contribution at 60 years old rises by 3.4 and 15.6 percentage points, men and women respectively. In the case of women in the fourth highest quintile, the difference between the two estimations is as high as 25 percentage points at the age of 60 and 12 percentage points at the age of 65. These results suggest that special bonuses may have a great impact on the proportion of public workers who satisfy the accessibility conditions, in particular in the case of women.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
Large segments of Latin American population are not covered by the old-age pension programs. Some workers stay out of the system all their lives, never contributing or receiving pensions.
Other workers contribute, but many of them do not reach the minimum number of periods of contribution required to qualify for a pension or for a minimum pension guarantee. There is increasing evidence of the existence of a significant number of workers making frequent transitions between formality and informality. Highly fragmented and incomplete histories of contribution to social security risk leaving these workers with no pension rights. This risk has probably been rising recently as the social security administrations have been increasing their ability to enforce the fulfillment of the qualifying conditions.
We propose in this paper a methodology to estimate the proportion of workers who would accumulate the number of periods of contribution required to access a pension, and to assess the impact of different explanatory variables (like the business cycle) on the fulfillment of this condition. The estimation represents a significant challenge because the information that is currently available to estimate the number of periods of contribution of each worker is incomplete. We propose a two-steps methodology to overcome this difficulty. In the first step, we estimate the probabilities of transition between contributing and not contributing at each age, using survival analysis. In the second step, we perform Monte Carlo simulations of the histories of contribution using the probabilities of transition estimated in the first step.
Using this methodology on a database of the main social security institution of Uruguay, the BPS, we found that the majority of contributors to this institution will not reach the required number of years of contribution to access a pension at the normal retirement age. Not at least if the current probabilities of transition between contributing and not contributing remain in the future the same as in the period of observation (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) . The required number of periods of contribution to access a pension in Uruguay is 35 years, which is unusually high for a developing country, but even when we estimate the proportion of contributors who would accumulate 30 years of contribution we get disappointingly low figures.
As expected, the business cycle has a sizeable impact on the probabilities that a private worker transits between contributing and not contributing. This consideration might be particularly relevant in our case, because Uruguay went through one of the most severe recessions of its history during the period in which the work history database was built. Nevertheless, when we repeated the simulations using the average unemployment rate of a longer period we still got that the majority of private workers would not accumulate the required 35 years of contribution at the normal retirement age (60 years).
Incomplete and highly fragmented histories of contribution are much more pervasive among low than among high income workers. This is hardly surprising, but the size of the differences is really striking. Consider for example the case of men working in the private sector. They have almost a 64% chance of reaching the required 35 years of contribution at 65 years if they belong to the richest quintile, but only 1% chance if they belong to the poorest quintile. The same figures for women are 56% and 4% for the richest and poorest quintiles, respectively.
These results suggest that this pension scheme requires some reform. In particular, the condition of having accumulated 35 years of contribution to access to a pension should be revised.
Several social security systems in Latin America seem to be facing similar challenges as the BPS in Uruguay and have now similar databases as the one used in this paper. The densities of contribution estimated in previous studies for countries like Argentina and Chile are similar to the ones we found for Uruguay. But the densities of contribution alone do not tell us what the probability is that a worker qualifies for a pension when he reaches the retirement age. The methodology proposed in this paper to estimate these probabilities and the factors that impact on them might thus be useful to assess the situation in other countries of Latin America as well. The table summarizes the results of running a random effects complementary loglog model for the state "contributing". The null hypothesis of zero variance of the individual effects was tested using a likelihood ratio test built in the xtcloglog STATA command. The hypothesis was rejected at the standard levels of significance in all the regressions. Source: Authors' computations using a sample of the work history database of the BPS The table summarizes the results of running a random effects complementary loglog model for the state "contributing". The null hypothesis of zero variance of the individual effects was tested using a likelihood ratio test built in the xtcloglog STATA command. The hypothesis was rejected at the standard levels of significance in all the regressions. Source: Authors' computations using a sample of the work history database of the BPS The table summarizes the results of running a random effects complementary loglog model for the state "contributing". The null hypothesis of zero variance of the individual effects was tested using a likelihood ratio test built in the xtcloglog STATA command. The hypothesis was rejected at the standard levels of significance in all the regressions. Source: Authors' computations using a sample of the work history database of the BPS The table summarizes the results of running a random effects complementary loglog model for the state "not contributing". The null hypothesis of zero variance of the individual effects was tested using a likelihood ratio test built in the xtcloglog STATA command. The hypothesis was rejected at the standard levels of significance in all the regressions. Source: Authors' computations using a sample of the work history database of the BPS The table summarizes the results of running a random effects complementary loglog model for the state "not contributing". The null hypothesis of zero variance of the individual effects was tested using a likelihood ratio test built in the xtcloglog STATA command. The hypothesis was rejected at the standard levels of significance in all the regressions. Source: Authors' computations using a sample of the work history database of the BPS 
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